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One Nation, One Election: The Anatomy of India’s Boldest Electoral Reform Category: News & Analysis / Politics Date: January 13, 2026
Introduction: The Return of the Simultaneous Vote In the sprawling, cacophonous theatre of Indian democracy, the curtain rarely falls. It is often said that India is perpetually in election mode. From the Panchayat level to the Parliament, the cycle of campaigning, voting, and counting is a constant hum in the background of governance. However, the central government’s push for "One Nation, One Election" (ONOE) seeks to silence this hum, condensing the electoral chaos into a singular, synchronized event every five years.
As we navigate the political landscape of 2026, the debate around ONOE has transitioned from a theoretical discussion to a legislative reality. The proposal, rooted in the recommendations of the High-Level Committee chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind, aims to synchronize elections to the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and State Legislative Assemblies. Proponents argue it is the "mother of all reforms," a necessary evolution to streamline governance and curb expenditure. Critics, comprising a formidable coalition of regional parties and constitutional scholars, view it as a death knell for federalism—a move that would subsume local narratives under a monolithic national mandate.
This analysis unpacks the multi-layered complexities of ONOE, examining the historical precedence, the economic arguments, the constitutional hurdles, and the profound shifts it threatens to bring to the voter’s psychology.
I. The Historical Context: Restoring the Default Settings? To understand the fervor behind ONOE, one must look back to the foundational years of the Republic. Contrary to popular belief, simultaneous elections are not a novel invention; they were the original default setting of Indian democracy.
In 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967, elections to the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies were held simultaneously. The voter entered the polling booth and cast two ballots—one for their Member of Parliament (MP) and one for their Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA). This synchronization was not by legislative force but by convention and the stability of the Congress party, which held power both at the Centre and in most states.
The cycle broke in the late 1960s, not due to design, but due to political volatility. The indiscriminate use of Article 356 (President’s Rule) to dissolve state assemblies, coupled with the premature dissolution of the Lok Sabha in 1970, fractured the timeline. Since then, the electoral calendar has fragmented further. Today, on average, five to seven state assembly elections occur every year, creating a perpetual cycle of Model Code of Conduct (MCC) enforcement, which the government claims leads to "policy paralysis."
The current push is framed as a "restoration" of that 1952-1967 era. However, critics note that the political landscape of the 1950s—dominated by a single party—is vastly different from the coalition-heavy, regionally diverse India of the 21st century.
II. The Economic Argument: Counting the Cost of Democracy The primary pillar of the government's argument is economic prudence. Elections in India are the most expensive democratic exercise in human history.
The Financial Drain Estimates from the Centre for Media Studies (CMS) suggested that the 2019 General Election alone cost nearly ₹60,000 crore (approx. $8 billion), including spending by political parties and the Election Commission of India (ECI). When state elections are added to this tally over a five-year cycle, the figure balloons significantly.
Proponents argue that holding separate elections doubles the deployment costs for security forces, the logistics of polling staff, and the procurement of materials. A synchronized election would theoretically slash the official administrative costs. The Law Commission of India, in its draft reports, has frequently cited these savings as a primary justification.
The Cost of "Policy Paralysis" Beyond direct cash expenditure, there is the "invisible cost" of governance. Every time an election is announced, the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) kicks in. Under the MCC, governments are barred from announcing new schemes, tendering new projects, or making significant policy shifts to ensure a level playing field.
With elections happening every few months in different states, the central government often finds itself in a state of perpetual MCC in one region or another. The Prime Minister and key Cabinet Ministers are also frequently on the campaign trail, diverting attention from administrative duties. ONOE promises a five-year window of uninterrupted governance, free from the populist pressures of imminent polls.
However, economists counter this by suggesting that election spending, while high, acts as a stimulus for the informal economy. The printing of banners, hiring of vehicles, and logistical spending injects liquidity into rural economies. Furthermore, they argue that the cost of democracy—roughly ₹500 per voter—is a small price to pay for federal accountability.
III. The Federalism Fault Line: National vs. Regional The most potent opposition to ONOE comes from the perspective of federalism. India is defined as a "Union of States," and the political behavior of a Tamil Nadu voter is distinct from that of a voter in Uttar Pradesh.
The "Overshadowing" Effect Political scientists have long observed a "coattail effect" in simultaneous elections. When a voter casts a ballot for the Prime Minister, they are statistically more likely to vote for the same party for the Chief Minister if the elections are held together. IDFC Institute studies analyzing electoral data have shown that there is a 77% chance that a voter will choose the same winning political party for both state and centre when elections are simultaneous. This probability drops significantly when elections are held six months apart.
Regional parties fear that ONOE will nationalize the narrative. In a standalone state election, issues like water management, local corruption, and linguistic pride take center stage. In a simultaneous election, these nuances risk being drowned out by "national" themes like national security, foreign policy, or the charisma of a Prime Minister. For parties like the DMK, TMC, or YSRCP, whose politics are deeply rooted in regional identity, ONOE is viewed as an existential threat designed to favor national parties with deep pockets and centralized command structures.
The Premature Dissolution Dilemma The biggest logical conundrum remains: What happens if a government falls? If ONOE is implemented, and a state government collapses two years into its term due to a loss of majority (a common occurrence in Indian politics), what happens next?
Mid-term Elections? If a fresh election is held for the remaining three years, the cycle is broken immediately.
President’s Rule? Keeping a state under unrepresentative President’s Rule for three years until the next national cycle is undemocratic and arguably unconstitutional.
The Kovind Panel recommended a "remainder term" solution: if a state assembly is dissolved early, the new government would only serve the remainder of the five-year term. Critics argue this disincentivizes stability and punishes the electorate by forcing frequent elections anyway, or worse, creating short-term governments unable to plan for the future.
IV. The Constitutional Labyrinth Implementing ONOE is not a matter of a simple bill; it requires a massive overhaul of the Constitution of India. The legal hurdles are steep and require a rare consensus.
Key Articles for Amendment To operationalize the plan, Parliament must amend at least five key articles:
Article 83: Deals with the duration of the Houses of Parliament.
Article 85: Relates to the dissolution of the Lok Sabha by the President.
Article 172: Deals with the duration of State Legislatures.
Article 174: Relates to the dissolution of State Assemblies.
Article 356: Provisions for President’s Rule.
The Ratification Hurdle Perhaps the most significant barrier is the requirement for ratification. Under Article 368, any amendment that alters the federal structure or the representation of states requires not just a special majority in Parliament (2/3rds present and voting), but also ratification by at least 50% of the State Legislatures.
Given the polarized nature of Indian politics, getting 50% of states to agree to a move that many regional leaders view as political suicide is a Herculean task. The government would need to navigate a complex web of alliances to push this through.
V. The Logistical Nightmare: EVMs and VVPATs Even if the politics and the laws align, the physics of the election presents a massive challenge. The Election Commission of India (ECI) is the machinery that makes democracy work, and ONOE places an unprecedented load on this machinery.
Machine Shortage Currently, the ECI manages the lifecycle of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) units by rotating them between states. When Karnataka votes, machines are moved there. When Rajasthan votes, they are moved there. Simultaneous elections would require the deployment of EVMs across every polling station in India at the exact same time. The ECI has estimated it would need to procure roughly 30 lakh (3 million) additional Control Units and VVPATs. The shelf life of an EVM is 15 years; manufacturing millions of machines to be used only three times (once every 5 years) is seen by some as a colossal waste of resources.
Security Deployment India’s elections are staggered over several phases (often lasting 6-7 weeks) primarily to allow Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) to move from region to region to ensure free and fair polling. Holding elections simultaneously might require an exponential increase in security personnel, or the election phases would have to be stretched out over 3-4 months to move the same troops around, negating the argument that ONOE "saves time."
VI. Global Precedents: Is India an Outlier? The debate often references international examples.
Sweden: Elections to the national parliament (Riksdag), county councils, and municipal councils are held on the same day. This is often cited as the gold standard. However, Sweden acts under a proportional representation system, and its population is smaller than that of Mumbai.
South Africa: Holds national and provincial elections simultaneously, but municipal elections are separate.
United Kingdom: Following the repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, the Prime Minister has the discretion to call elections, making synchronization impossible by law.
United States: Holds elections on fixed dates, but the sheer complexity of their federal structure means voters are often voting for dozens of positions (President, Senate, House, Judges, Sheriffs) on a single massive ballot paper.
India’s challenge is unique because of its scale (970 million+ voters) and its First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system, where individual candidates matter as much as parties.
Conclusion: A reform for Efficiency or Centralization? As the debate rages in 2026, the "One Nation, One Election" proposal stands as a Rorschach test for Indian democracy.
To the efficiency advocate, it is a logical modernization—a way to pull India out of the 20th-century cycle of perpetual campaigning and into a 21st-century model of streamlined governance. It promises a government that works for 4.5 years and campaigns for 0.5 years, rather than the other way around.
To the constitutionalist and the regionalist, it is a Trojan horse for centralization. They fear it will turn the rich tapestry of Indian politics into a binary choice, favoring a presidential style of contest that the framers of the Constitution explicitly rejected. They argue that the "noise" of frequent elections is not a bug, but a feature—a constant feedback loop that keeps the rulers on their toes.
The passage of this bill will depend on the government's ability to muster the numbers in the Rajya Sabha and, more importantly, to convince the states that they are not signing their own death warrants. Whatever the outcome, the ONOE debate has forced the nation to look in the mirror and ask a fundamental question: Do we value the efficiency of the outcome, or the messy, vibrant inclusivity of the process?
In the end, the success of One Nation, One Election will not be measured by the money saved, but by whether the voice of the solitary voter in a remote village—concerned with her local road and her local water supply—can still be heard above the roar of a synchronized national juggernaut.